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When Orders of Worth Clash: Negotiating Legitimacy in Situations of Moral 
Multiplexity 
 
 
Abstract 
How is moral legitimacy established in pluralist contexts where multiple moral frameworks 
co-exist and compete? Situations of moral multiplexity complicate not only whether an 
organization or practice is legitimate but also which criteria should be used to establish moral 
legitimacy. We argue that moral legitimacy can be thought of as the property of a dynamic 
dialogical process in which relations between moral schemes are constantly (re-)negotiated 
through dynamic exchange with audiences. Drawing on Boltanski and Thévenot’s “orders of 
worth” framework, we propose a process model of how three types of truces may be 
negotiated: transcendence, compromise, antagonism. While each can create moral legitimacy 
in pluralistic contexts, legitimacy is not a binary variable but varying in degrees of scope and 
certainty.  
 
Key words: Economies of worth, French pragmatist sociology, dialogue, justifications, 
moral legitimacy, convention theory. 
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Introduction 
Legitimacy is key to institutions and organizations (Suchman, 1995), yet the moral dimension 
has become increasingly pressing (Scherer & Palazzo, 2007, 2011). Moral talk was once the 
preserve of various citizen and activist groups, such as the anti-sweatshop campaign against 
Nike (e.g. Klein, 1999). Now moral language has become a common practice among 
businesses. Google for instance started with  the corporate slogan 'Don't be evil'.  
Yet as companies face an environment with a greater range of moral schemes, this value 
pluralisation means that often conflicting society-wide moral schemes co-exist. This 
conundrum in turn means what is right can be fiercely contested. This begs the question, how 
is moral legitimacy established in pluralist contexts where multiple moral frameworks co-
exist and compete? Moral legitimacy refers to judgments that “usually reflect beliefs about 
whether the activity effectively promotes societal welfare, as defined by the audience's 
socially constructed value system” (Suchman, 1995, p. 579), or simply to "the right thing to 
do"1. This widely-adopted definition clearly emphasizes the notion of audience evaluation and 
of conformity or ‘fit’. Audiences (e.g. media, regulators) assess conformity of an organization 
or a practice with well-established legitimate forms in order to make legitimacy judgements 
(Bitektine, 2011; Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Plunkett Tost, 2011). To be seen as morally 
legitimate by evaluating audiences, organizations need to create an alignment between their 
own activities and goals and those encoded in broader social life, such as wide-spread moral 
schemes (Friedland & Alford, 1991).  
Yet when organizations face morally complex situations in which the moral criteria are 
unclear, which we call ‘moral multiplexity,’ gaining moral legitimacy is not simply a matter 
of creating fit between an organization's activity and a societal-level moral scheme. Scherer 
and Palazzo (2011, p. 915) argue that “value pluralization of modern society and the fact that 
multinational corporations operate within numerous and sometimes contradictory legal and 
moral contexts, makes a simple adaption to external expectations difficult”. In such contexts, 
moral legitimacy is socially and argumentatively constructed through a communicative 
process  involving dialogue between an organization and its relevant audiences (Palazzo & 
Scherer, 2006; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011; Scherer, Palazzo, & Seidl, 2013). This prompts a 
rethinking of moral legitimacy as a property of organizations and entities achieved through 
passive normative compliance with audience expectations. Moral legitimation becomes a 
multi-actor process in which parties establish moral arguments: “Moral legitimacy is a result 
of a communicative process and finally rests on the ‘forceless force of the better argument” 
(Habermas, 1990, p. 185). As the property of the dynamic interchange between an 
organization and relevant audiences, “legitimacy is something entities and audiences do, not 
something entities merely have” (Barley, 2008, p. 506). Conceptualizing moral legitimacy as 
a process occurring between multiple actors, audiences can no longer be thought of as an 
external judge but need to be understood as part of the dialogue and constituents of 
legitimacy. This shifts attention towards the role of civil society actors, such as NGOs, social 
movements, consumer organizations but also government, media and industry associations 
                                                             
1To be sure, moral legitimacy is commonly considered as only one of three kinds of legitimacy 
(Suchman, 1995). First, (and perhaps most commonly discussed) cognitive legitimacy refers to 
subconscious, taken-for-granted assumptions or schemata which are used to categorise an organization 
to a certain pre-existing class or category (e.g. Ruef & Scott, 1998). Second, pragmatic legitimacy 
results from calculative and self-interested evaluating audiences looking for favourable exchanges (e.g. 
Barron, 1998). 
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who form the broader public context in which dialogue takes place. But while this 
communicative approach provides a foundational understanding into moral legitimacy as a 
dialogical process, it remains less clear how participants give moral substance to their 
arguments. 
In this paper, we explore in more depth how moral legitimacy is co-achieved in situations 
where there are multiple values through a process of dialogue. To better understand the 
process through which parties establish moral arguments, we draw on French pragmatist 
sociology and its typology of different orders or “economies of worth”2 (Boltanski & 
Thévenot, 2006). Scholars have suggested that orders of worth, which each provide a 
template of what is considered to be valuable and worthy, are mobilized by organizational 
actors to justify arrangements and (re-)establish moral legitimacy (Brandl, Daudigeos, 
Edwards, & Pernkopf-Konhäusner, 2014; Bullinger, 2014; Patriotta, Gond, & Schultz, 2011; 
Ramirez, 2013; Reinecke, 2010; van Bommel, 2014). We build on this work by developing a 
framework for understanding how organizations and their audiences build and maintain 
legitimacy in a context of moral multiplexity. While a communicative approach focuses on 
the idea that moral legitimacy is co-achieved through dialogue, the orders of worth 
framework allows us to identify the ways in which moral discourse is structured around 
orders of worth, which provide a sense of what is just. 
To make our argument, we will proceed as follows. First, we examine existing 
conceptualizations of moral legitimacy and introduce a theoretical approach to moral 
legitimacy by drawing on the orders of worth perspective. We then develop a process model 
conceptualizing how legitimacy in situations of moral multiplexity is achieved through 
justifications in dialogue. Finally, we discuss the implications for the study of moral 
legitimacy and institutional complexity and chart out future lines of research. 
 
Moral Legitimacy in Organization Theory: Conformity and Fit  
Table 1 provides a comparison of various theoretical understanding of moral legitimacy that 
will be discussed below. We take Ruef & Scott’s (1998) outline of legitimacy’s background as 
a starting point (Weber, Parsons, neo-institutional) yet at the same time extend these 
theoretical understandings and add more recent theoretical perspectives (institutional logics, 
communicative approach and orders of worth) that help us to construct our argument.   
INSERT TABLE ONE HERE 
Weberian Approaches 
The question of morality has been at the heart of debates about legitimacy since at least Max 
Weber (M. Weber, 1947, 1968). Weber argued social actors are typically guided by a 
legitimate order – which is made up by a set of 'obligatory maxims' of how people should act. 
These obligatory maxims are part of wider patterns of  broad accepted societal norms which 
actors must appeal to make their forms of social action appear as legitimate. Weber’s study of 
the rise of bureaucracy is a well-known example where he sketches out how legitimacy is 
established through reference to moral claims. The increasing institutionalization of modern 
rationality as a dominant societal wide norm meant that exercises of authority no longer had 
to be grounded with reference to traditional norms, such as kinship (which was the case with 
                                                             
2 We use the terms ‘orders of worth’ throughout this article.  
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traditional authority), or inherent personal qualities (which is the case with personal 
charisma). Rather, authority could be gained with reference to increasing prevalent norms of 
rationalisation, and in particular bureaucratic rationalisation in society. Weber’s account of 
modern bureaucracy had a specific set of moral characteristics underpinning it, which gave 
the bureaucracy and its bureaucrats a degree of legitimacy. Additionally, Weber’s idea of 
value rationalization and the notion of ‘value spheres’ (see e.g. M. Weber, 1991) is helpful 
here for our later discussion of legitimacy. He argues that an action, position or decision “can 
be taken only from a standpoint, cultural beings must occupy a space from which they can 
understand the world and their place in it” (Oakes, 2003, p. 37). For Weber, several 
incommensurable value spheres (religion, the economy, politics, aesthetics, the erotic and 
intellectualism) are sufficiently abstract and generalizable that value positions are grounded 
on its principles. This resonates with the orders of worth perspective explained below, albeit 
that the latter explicitly discusses the combinatorial possibilities of a multiplicity of “orders of 
worth” (Friedland, 2014).  
Parsonian Approaches 
The classical Weberian account of legitimacy suggests that alignment with broad social 
norms, such as the norms of rationalization, is essential if broad forms of authority are to 
appear legitimate. Accounts of organizations influenced by Talcott Parsons have taken up the 
challenge of drawing out the implications for specific organizations. According to Parsons, 
legitimacy involved “the appraisal of action in terms of shared or common values” (Parsons, 
1960, p. 175). Establishing legitimacy means ensuring that there is alignment between one’s 
actions and the subsystems of values in a society. Parsons (1956) argued that organizations 
typically seek to do this through their articulated goals or objects. Thus an organization would 
be seen as legitimate to the extent that it fitted with the broader values of a society (Dowling 
& Pfeffer, 1975). Documenting the fate of the YMCA in a secularizing America, Zald and 
Denton (1963) show how a misfit between the organization and broader social values 
occurred when the organization failed to keep pace with changes in the broader social values. 
In his study on the use of pigeons on a pharmaceutical production line, Perrow (1970) argued 
that an organization could respond to a misfit with established social values by either 
changing its own practices, transforming the social values themselves or creating a kind of 
symbolic-identification between an organization and these values (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975). 
This Parsonian approach shares the assumption with Weber that legitimacy is established 
through reference to societal wide values. These are taken to be relatively unitary in nature 
and primarily expressed through communication. But this approach goes further in outlining 
how such norms might be a target for strategic action on the part of organizations.    
Neo-Institutional Approaches 
Parsonian accounts of moral legitimacy make some problematic assumptions about the nature 
of moral schemes. First, norms and social values are treated as social entities with almost a 
thing-like status (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Suchman, 1995). Second, because of this, many 
of the conflicts and inconsistencies within societal wide norms are typically ignored. Parting 
ways with Parsonian approaches to moral legitimacy, neo-institutional approaches (Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977) highlight how dominant, societal wide, institutionalized myths are not the 
expression of some deeper values based subsystem. Rather, organizations explicitly couch 
their account of legitimacy as a social construct which shapes actors’ interpretations and 
understandings of organizations. For instance, John Meyer and colleagues (1997) have 
studied how organizations create a fit between their own activity and the notion of rationality 
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propagated by the professions. In their article, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) principally 
equate moral legitimacy with 'normative isomorphism' which is largely driven by the norms 
of professional groups3. In this sense, neo-institutionalists placed the quest for legitimacy at 
the heart of organizational activity. Following this approach, moral legitimacy largely refers 
to institutional myths which are produced by professional norms and values that are provided 
by accreditation bodies, rankings, industry standards, professional associations etc. However, 
professional groups would often compete for the most appropriate rational frameworks. For 
instance, Ruef and Scott (1998, p. 878) in their study on hospital survival in the San Francisco 
area trace out the struggle between different bodies of institutionalised myths propagated by 
two professional bodies – managers and medics. Although organizations are faced with “the 
application of generalized societal norms such as fair play”, they are still “particularly 
constrained by the existence of a variety of occupational and professional standards to which 
their participants subscribe”. Moral legitimacy is here seen as the alignment or fit with the 
“normative rules that introduce a prescriptive, evaluative, and obligatory dimension into 
social life” (Scott, 1995, p. 37).  
Institutional logics 
Studies of institutional logics have extended the sources of moral legitimacy beyond 
professional norms to a whole range of institutional logics, which are a function of wide-
spread moral schemes (Friedland & Alford, 1991). The notion of institutional logics 
holistically integrates the coercive, normative, and cognitive aspects of institutions (Thornton 
& Ocasio, 1999). Fields are typically characterised by institutional logics, including the 
family, state, market, democracy and religion and the professions “which presume and 
performatively produce values” (Friedland, 2009, p. 907). Each of these logics makes 
different sets of practices, subjects and sets of values legitimate. This means that moral 
legitimacy is seen to result from an organization aligning itself with a dominant institutional 
logic in its field. For instance, the emergence of thrifts (a type of financial institutions 
targeting small savers and home-owners) was partly due to the widespread moral sentiment of 
progressivism embodied in this new organizational form (Haveman & Rao, 1997). 
Neo-institutional scholars increasingly appreciate the complexity of institutional fields and 
the co-existence of multiple and often conflicting institutional logics (Greenwood, Diaz, Li, & 
Lorente, 2010; Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011; Marquis & 
Lounsbury, 2007; Purdy & Gray, 2009; Zilber, 2002). Following Oliver’s (1991) typology of 
responses to institutional pressures, Pache and Santos (2010) have examined organizations’ 
repertoires for responding to conflicting institutional demands: Organizations can acquiesce to 
demands, compromise to achieve partial conformity, avoid conformity, defy these demands 
and engage in manipulation4. Hybrid organizational forms have been a popular site to study 
such responses (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Tracey, Phillips, & Jarvis, 2011). For instance a 
multinational bank has to prove its market worth to compete on international financial 
                                                             
3 Some studies have used normative legitimacy rather than moral legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1991; Greenwood, Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002; Scott, 1995). We use moral legitimacy throughout this 
article. 
4 The fifth response strategy, manipulation, “refers to the active attempt to alter the content of 
institutional requirements and to influence their promoters. Oliver (1991) pointed to three specific 
manipulation tactics: organizations may attempt to co-opt the sources of the institutional pressures to 
neutralize institutional divergences, to influence the definition of norms through active lobbying, or, 
more radically, to control the source of pressure.” 
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markets, but adopt a moral scheme of community responsibility when dealing with local 
depositor communities (Peredo & Chrisman, 2006).  
We argue that there are remaining challenges to viewing moral legitimacy as the outcome of  
conformity with (multiple) institutional logics. First, and most importantly, this approach 
leaves unexplained the role of audiences in legitimating organizational practices in the face of 
moral multiplexity. Moral legitimacy is typically seen as the product of audience assessment 
or a form of social judgment (e.g. Plunkett Tost, 2011), defined as “an evaluator’s decision or 
opinion about the social properties of an organization” (Bitektine, 2011, p. 152). This suggests 
a one-way relationship between organizations and their evaluating audiences who confer 
legitimacy. Second, while institutional approaches conceptualize legitimacy as a binary and 
dichotomous variable – organizations and practices are either legitimate or not – the role of 
audiences suggests that different audiences may apply different criteria for evaluating a 
practice, and legitimacy evaluations may be made on a continuum. Third, too often multiple 
logics/institutional demands are seen as a phenomenon that occurs in special conditions, such 
as fragmented fields (Pache & Santos, 2010). In the normal situation, each sphere is 
associated with a distinct logic (Friedland & Alford, 1991). Because each sphere is associated 
with a distinct logic, rather than a mixture of logics, it assumes that prescriptions of different 
logics are incompatible. This underplays, on the one hand, the normality of multiplexity and 
the resulting uncertainty (Gond & Leca, 2011), and on the other hand, the opportunities to 
exploit the frictions at the interplay of multiple orders of worth (Stark, 2009). Fourth, the 
specific moral foundations of legitimacy gets lost, namely the alignment with broad sets of 
values.  
From Conformity to Dialogue: Communicative approach 
As an alternative, Scherer and Palazzo’s communicative approach calls for rethinking 
processes of acquiring moral legitimacy based on the changing conditions of moral 
legitimacy, where ‘simple’ conformity with stable, pre-defined and wide-spread norms is no 
longer sufficient: “In the changing institutional context of global governance, this stable 
framework of law and moral custom is eroding and corporations have to find new ways of 
keeping their licences to operate” (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011, p. 907). While the notion of 
institutional logics collapses the normative, cognitive and regulative foundations into a single 
concept, Scherer and Palazzo point to the specifically moral foundations of legitimacy and 
their discursive basis. Moral legitimacy “is socially and argumentatively constructed by 
means of considering reasons to justify certain actions, practices, or institutions and is thus 
present in discourses between the corporation and its relevant publics” (Scherer & Palazzo, 
2011, p. 915).  
This recasts the quest for moral legitimacy in terms of a communicative process involving 
dialogue with diverse parties, including organizations and their audiences. Moral legitimacy is 
thus the outcome of dialogue: “Moral legitimacy is a result of a communicative process and 
finally rests on the ‘forceless force of the better argument’ ” (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011, p. 
915). This approach builds on a concept of deliberative democracy developed by Habermas 
(1996, 1998). Organizations cannot shield their actions from democratic public scrutiny. 
Instead, organizations are seen as embedded in civil society processes of democratic will 
formation. Embeddedness in civil society means that moral legitimacy is conjointly 
established with audiences, including civil society networks, NGOs, social movements and 
other institutions of public – and increasingly transnational – governance. To be legitimate, 
corporations do not merely have to comply with the law and moral customs but they need to 
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understand their role as political actors and become active participants in the direct 
democratic will formation of collective civil society actors. As Scherer & Palazzo (2007, p. 
1109) put it “Some corporations do not simply follow powerful external expectations by 
complying with societal standards in legal and moral terms; they engage in discourses that 
aim at setting or redefining those standards and expectations in a changing, globalizing world 
and assume an enlarged political co-responsibility”.  
To be sure, scholars have studied the discursive struggles of legitimation (Erkama & Vaara, 
2010; Golant & Sillince, 2007) in which rhetorical strategies are not only used to frame 
conformity but also serve to manipulate meaning systems (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). 
The Habermasian approach, however, does not regard communication in terms of the more 
traditional “sender-receiver model” of communication. Instead it focuses on how legitimacy is 
negotiated between the organization and external actors in dialogue (Scherer et al., 2013) and 
the mechanisms by which actors can reach reasonable agreement over moral grounds 
(Reinecke & Ansari, 2015). This ascribes agency to both organizations and audiences in 
actively interpreting and influencing social acceptance and approval and, in some instances, 
transforming stakeholder pressures and institutional demands. Multi-stakeholder initiatives, 
such as the Forest Stewardship Council or Fairtrade, exemplify the deliberative approach that 
brings together a multitude of industry and civil society actors to jointly deliberate upon 
solutions to societal problems such as sustainable global forest management or fair trading 
(Reinecke & Ansari, 2015; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007). 
While Scherer and Palazzo’s communicative approach is innovative in the sense that it views 
legitimation as a dialogical process and that it makes audiences part of this legitimation 
process, the approach leaves a number of question unanswered. First, the focus on the 
procedural elements of dialogue means that little attention is paid to the content of dialogue. 
What constitutes the “force of the better argument”? Similar to the Habermasian notion of 
dialogue, the orders of worth framework focuses on justice and the common good: The 
“imperative to justify” requires that people abstract from the particular situation to mobilise 
higher-level constructions of the common good. But while the Habermasian approach implies 
that forms of reason and justification can be freely and creatively constructed in the process of 
dialogue, orders of worth provides a useful framework that helps us understand how actors 
give substance to their moral legitimacy claims through justifications that are subject to 
“requirements resembling those of a grammar” (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006, p. 140). To be 
morally convincing and prove “the force of the better argument” in dialogue, actors draw on 
orders of worth that provide moral substance to reasoning (Annisette & Richardson, 2011; 
Messner, Clegg, & Kornberger, 2008; Wagner, 1999). In other words, actors support their 
justifications that are based on existing moral schemes: orders of worth that act as “powerful 
constraints in the search for well-founded arguments based on solid proofs” (Boltanski & 
Thévenot, 2006, p. 13). The heuristic power of analysing the “pragmatics of judgement” 
(Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006, p. 15) lies hereby in the ability to link macro-level conceptions 
of the ‘good’ and the ‘just’ to their actual instantiations in the real life of the social world. 
Second, while the communicative approach departs with the rather idealized conditions of the 
Habermasian “ideal speech situation” including equal participation and “absence of coercion” 
(Habermas, 1993, p. 56), the approach lacks an account of determining what makes some 
voices more legitimate than others in a dialogue. The idea that dialogue can be freed from 
power is a “liberal illusion”, as Mouffe (2000, p. 20) argues (see also Jacobsson & Garsten, 
2012). Looking at the broader research programme of the orders of worth approach, it 
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becomes clear that justification and power interact (Boltanski, 2011; Gond, Barin Cruz, 
Raufflet, & Charron, 2016). In the regime of “justification” (‘dispute en justice’, Boltanski, 
1990), in which disagreement in social interactions are subjected to the “imperative to 
justify,” domination may work to impose (or avoid) certain forms of justification (Boltanski, 
2011). In the regime of “violence”, the “imperative to justify” may even be suspended 
through physical or symbolic violence. In the regime of “peace” stabilized by institutionalized 
and routinized situations (‘paix en justesse’, Boltanski, 1990), dominant justifications may 
prevail without being questioned. Yet, actors also have the reflexive competence and skill to 
question the moral justifications that underpin the allocation of worth (and domination). 
Third, the Habermasian model strongly rests on the idea of consensus and agreement among 
parties participating in the dialogue as the foundation of moral legitimacy. However, while the 
deliberative approach implies that dialogue always leads to consensus, in reality dialogue may 
result in different outcomes. The idea that the “force of the better argument wins” refers to the 
capability of rational actors to change their positions and preferences based on rational 
arguments presented. However, consensus may not always be possible. Positions among 
actors may be too antagonistic too arrive at agreement (Mouffe, 1993). Or, consensus may be 
weak, when agreements are tolerated but silently criticised. Or, agreement may only refer to 
smaller subsection of society, but practices may still not be accepted universally. Consensus 
may be limited in scope. This points to the fact that there may be different gradations on 
consensus reflecting different levels of agreements.  
A Framework for Moral Justification: Orders of Worth 
In order to better understand the process of communicative action and how moral legitimacy 
is co-achieved through dialogue, we draw on Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot's (2006) 
orders of worth framework. At the heart of this framework is an analysis of how actors prove 
themselves legitimate in situations of moral uncertainty, where the criteria for judging moral 
legitimacy are unclear and contested. This provides an important complement to the 
communicative approach by offering a framework of different moral legitimacy criteria that 
actors draw upon through justification but also clues as to how disputes between multiple 
orders of worth may be resolved.  
Orders of worth provide the normative basis for legitimacy as they determine the criteria for 
evaluating the worth of people, objects and practices, giving  “direction to the ordinary sense 
of what is just” (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006, p. 74). They are broad values-based ideal-type 
constructions that rest upon a particular conception of the common good. The orders of worth 
identified by Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) include inspired worth based on creativity and 
insight, domestic worth based on kinship and paternal authority, fame worth based on 
reputations, civic worth where the common good is constituted by the general will, market 
worth based on notions of reciprocal profit through trade, the industrial worth based on of 
efficiency and rational organization of society. 
Subsequent work has documented how two new orders of worth emerged through field-
reconfiguring discourses: “projective” worth based on connectivity and flexibility and 
providing the new spirit of capitalism (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005), and “green” worth 
based on principles of environmental friendliness (Lafaye & Thévenot, 1993; Lamont & 
Thévenot, 2000). This indicates that wider, societal-level discourse can engender socio-
cultural micro-changes that may result in the creation of new orders of worth. Table 2 
summarizes a selection of the different characteristics of each of the different orders of worth 
that Boltanski and Thévenot identify. 
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INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
Scholars have compared orders of worth with institutional logics (Brandl et al., 2014; Cloutier 
& Langley, 2013; Gond & Leca, 2011), which are similarly socially constructed, historical 
patterns comprised of cultural symbols, material practices, assumptions, values and beliefs. 
However, we suggest that the following aspects make orders of worth a particularly valuable 
framework for understanding moral legitimacy.  
Focus on the moral: The orders of worth framework is based on a “conceptualization of 
justice that stresses and theorizes with depth the moral foundations of legitimacy” (Gond & 
Leca, 2011, p. 13). Actors need to justify that a certain practice promotes the ‘common good’ 
– being beneficial to all – rather than individual gain. Worthiness hence relates to a sense of 
justice so that the “notions of worth and of the common good are merged, combined in the 
higher common principle” (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006, p. 77, emphasis original). The 
capability of reaching legitimate agreement through justifications thereby rests on the 
recognition of a shared, common humanity, which surpasses the particular interests of each 
participant in a dialogue. This places limits on what can be justified and called morally 
legitimate. Trade in human slaves, forced labour or the practice of eugenics are incompatible 
with the principle of common humanity and remain illegitimate states of worth.  
Focus on agency and dialogical resources: The research programme of a pragmatist 
sociology of critique (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006; Breviglieri, Lafaye, & Trom, 2009) has 
grown out of criticism of Bourdieu’s critical theory as a structuralist theory of domination, 
which treats actors as passive bearers of structures of domination (“social dopes”). It was 
concerned with the contradictions of Bourdieu’s critical sociology that wanted to be 
emancipatory, but saw the world as “constituted by ‘structures’, inhabited by the ‘laws of 
social fields’ and propelled by ‘forces’ that escape the consciousness of social actors” 
(Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005, p. x). The orders of worth framework aimed at elaborating a 
language that was capable of talking about people’s justifications and moral values “without 
reducing them to mere ideological masks of expressions of false consciousness” (Boltanski & 
Chiapello, 2005, p. xi). Because orders of worth are potentially always in conflict, in ongoing 
negotiations of moral legitimacy, actors become increasingly reflective about the assumptions 
and interpretive schema according to which situations are rendered legitimate (Boltanski & 
Thévenot, 2006, p. 134). This celebrates the critical competencies of reflective, skilled actors 
(e.g. ‘Love and Justice as Competences’, Boltanski, 1990), implying that actors learn to 
master a moral language game in which they draw on orders of worth as dialogical resources 
rather than internalise them as external socio-moral structures.  
Higher common principle: Each order of worth involves a higher common principle which 
provides criteria for making comparisons and judging whether someone or something is 
worthy or not. For instance, market worth is associated with the higher common principle of 
competitiveness and price as a measure of worth.5 Encoded within each order of worth are 
situations where one is asked to demonstrate their worthiness in a particular peak moment 
which Boltanski and Thévenot call a Test. The test is hereby a theoretical instrument that 
encapsulates both relations of force and the exigency of legitimacy as justice. To assign 
worth, tests establish equivalencies according to general organising principles. For example, 
in a university exam, a payment (market worth) will not allow a student to pass as the exam 
                                                             
5 The example of the market world are taken from Boltanski and Thévenot's (2006, pp.193-203) own 
analysis of the market world  
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tests for an alternative order of worth (civic worth). Yet, most situations are likely to involve a 
combination of several higher common principles, or moral criteria, at once.  
Temporary truces: Moral legitimacy is a constant achievement that reflects provisional 
“ethical truces” (Reinecke & Ansari, 2015), between multiple orders of worth, with varying 
degrees of stability since the tension between multiple orders of worth is never completely 
resolved. The institutional world is not seen “as a functionally unified Gestalt but as a 
complex pattern governed by opposing forces and hence in continual flux” (Blau, 1974, p. 
36). Rather than the exception, all organizational contexts are characterised by multiple orders 
of worth, creating uncertainty not only whether an actor or practice meets the criteria of 
worth, but creates uncertainty as to which order of worth should apply (Stark, 2009). Orders 
of worth are potentially always in conflict so that peaceful social order is a constant 
achievement of negotiating compromises and constructing agreement. For example, Stark 
(2009) stresses the heterarchy of the modern organization, where different organizational 
units are held accountable according to different principles of evaluation, yet the organization 
needs to function harmoniously as a whole. This creates an ongoing possibility to revoke 
compromises between orders of worth and create uncertainty. 
Processual view of moral legitimacy: Moral legitimacy is not a binary either/or-type property 
but is a dynamic and evolving communicative process that is co-produced in dialogue with 
audiences. Organizations may have different degrees of worthiness according to different 
orders of worth, and thus different audiences valuing them differently. Using the translation 
from the French “grandeur” (=greatness), organizations can be ‘great’ or ‘small’ in each order 
of worth (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006; Cloutier & Langley, 2013). For example, a successful 
mining company may have high market worth but low green worth. Organizations therefore 
need to draw on a range of different orders of worth at once and actively negotiate and re-
negotiate the relations among them in order to construct moral legitimacy. The relationship 
between orders of worth becomes the focus for much activity on the part of various actors 
which seek to create, reinforce or disrupt what are seen as legitimate composite arrangements.   
Differential power and capability: Pragmatist sociology also offers a nuanced approach to 
power. Power depends on actors’ ability to effectively mobilise arguments from broader moral 
schemes. Yet, the ability to mobilize different orders of worth successfully is not equally 
distributed. Different orders of worth each provide a template for what is considered to be 
valuable and worthy, and who can be a legitimate spokesperson. Justifications are also 
justifications of power, which highlight the normative regulation of power and how moral 
justifications can alter power dynamics (Gond et al., 2016). By recourse to orders of worth 
justifications may infuse a social arrangement with worthiness, so that it does not appear like 
“the unjustifiable act of ‘domination’ that only serves the ‘personal interests’ of those who 
benefit from it” (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006, p. 67). This explains why actors, even if 
endowed with reflective competence (Boltanski, 1990), will not always call moral legitimacy 
into question, but accept the dominance of particular orders of worth and their position within 
as ‘justified’ (Boltanski, 2011). For example, airline passengers in economy class typically do 
not question discrimination vis-à-vis passengers in business class. By paying less at the ‘test’ 
moment of purchasing a ticket, economy class passengers make a lesser investment into the 
market order of worth.  
 
Investment: A key feature of the orders of worth perspective is that orders of worth are not 
purely rhetorical and communicative devices, as for instance frames are in the literature on 
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social movements (Benford & Snow, 2000). Instead, worthiness requires tangible investments 
if one wants to become a legitimate spokesperson on behalf of an order of worth, and 
effectively and credibly mobilize justifications (such as “investment” in a business class 
ticket). Through investing into objects and forms of relations that are deemed worthy within 
the order of worth in question, actors gain “grandeur” as alluded to in the French title 
“economies de la grandeur” (economies of worth/greatness). The type of investment is 
specified by an ‘investment formula’ that is specific to each order of worth (Boltanski & 
Thévenot, 2006). Investments can be costly since “self-centered pleasure […] has to be 
sacrificed to reach a higher state of worth” (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006, p. 76).  
In sum, the orders of worth framework provides a lens for addressing the question of how 
practices are justified under moral multiplexity that adds further nuance to the process of 
dialogue as in the communicative approach.  
Towards a Process Model of Negotiation Moral Legitimacy  
Building on the orders of worth perspective, we develop a process model of how moral 
legitimacy is co-achieved through justifications in dialogue with relevant audiences, which 
gives rise to different patterns of moral legitimacy (see Figure 1). 
INSERT FIGURE ONE HERE 
Uncertainty as a challenge to established worth: The “imperative to justify” emerges only in 
special ‘critical moments’ of dispute, when the legitimacy of an institutionalised ‘regime of 
peace’ (“paix en justesse”) is challenged and turns into a contested ‘regime of justification’ 
(“dispute en justice”), as Boltanski (2011)6 calls the different regimes of action. In most 
situations, actors are not called upon to engage in dialogue and give a moral account of 
themselves. This is because in the regime of peace qualifications of worth are temporarily 
stabilized as they are embedded within widely accepted organizational routines, objects or 
technologies. Conventions, often composed of compromises between orders of worth, thus 
create some temporary stability (Thévenot, 2001). But this “taken-for-granted” approach is 
maintained only so long as the question of justification is suspended” (Boltanski & Thévenot, 
2006, pp. 136–7). The plurality of orders of worth creates a constant uncertainty that 
worthiness may be questioned from within alternative orders of worth. Taken-for-granted 
legitimacy in a “state of peace” is always only a temporary truce or “provisional settlement” 
(Kaplan & Murray, 2010). Below we outline situations which can trigger tension between 
multiple orders of worth. 
Contentiousness due to social movements: The recent literature on social movements offers 
important clues about how moral legitimacy challenges are organized. Scholars have 
documented the ways in which social movements challenge existing moral orders “by 
encouraging innovation and by transforming what is seen as acceptable market practice” 
(King & Pearce, 2010). Social movement activists have been described as market rebels (Rao, 
2009) or the engine of hegemonic struggle that offer resistance against hegemonic moral 
discourses (Spicer & Bohm, 2007). They also act as institutional entrepreneurs who mobilize 
alternative moral orders to devise, introduce and establish new practices (Helms, Oliver, & 
                                                             
6 “Justification” and “the state of peace” are part of Boltanski’s (1990) four quadrant schemata of 
possible modes of action where social interaction is subjected to the requirement of justification. 'Love' 
and 'violence' are the two other modes of action that suspend justifications, because there is either no 
need (‘love’) or actors fail to recognise their common humanity (‘war’) [‘all is fair in love and war’] 
 Reinecke, Bommel & Spicer – Negotiating Legitimacy – RSO  13 
Webb, 2012; Levy & Scully, 2007; Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004). For instance, social 
movements have championed new green industries and product markets (Lounsbury, 
Ventresca, & Hirsch, 2003; Weber, Heinze, & DeSoucey, 2008), created new lifestyles based 
on values of greenness and authenticity (Van Bommel & Spicer, 2011) or re-shaped the 
normative domain for what counts as a responsible company (Helms et al., 2012; Reinecke & 
Ansari, 2016). Common to all these works is the notion that social movements mobilize 
alternative moral schemes to challenge the moral legitimacy of existing arrangements and 
infuse new, potentially conflicting values.  
Legitimacy crises triggered by external jolts: Taken-for-granted worthiness may also become 
attacked and other, competing orders of worth are evoked, in situations of ‘legitimacy crises’ 
(Kostova & Zaheer, 1999), such as when organizations are accused of illegitimate actions 
(Lamin & Zaheer, 2012; Lange & Washburn, 2012; Pfarrer, Decelles, Smith, & Taylor, 2008). 
For example, the 2011 Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico revealed BP’s 
deficiency with regards to its green worth despite its green investment and re-branding as 
‘Beyond Petroleum’. To regain moral legitimacy organizations need to engage in moral 
‘repair work’. For instance, Patriotta and colleagues (2011) examined how an energy 
company involved in a nuclear incident tried to restore its moral legitimacy by engaging in 
public discourse, thereby using justifications from the market, civic, green and industrial 
orders of worth. Garud and colleagues (2010) explored how nuclear power had become 
represented as an ‘emission-free’, ‘clean’ and ‘sustainable’ technology to meet humanity’s 
energy demands as power companies increasingly mobilized the green order of worth. 
However, the 2011 nuclear disaster of Fukushima renewed the legitimacy crisis at global scale 
and turned nuclear power into a ‘dangerous’ and ultimately ‘destructive’ technology. The 
aftermath of the financial crisis led large parts of society, exemplified by the global Occupy 
movement, to question the taken-for-granted moral order underlying existing arrangements in 
financial markets. Private equity firms struggled to use market-based justifications to secure 
their moral legitimacy of (De Cock & Nyberg, 2016). These jolts destabilised the taken-for-
grantedness of previous justifications.  
Unique situations: A situation may also be relatively unique and unusual. Because of the lack 
of routines and technologies, actors are forced to make novel moral judgements with little 
prior guidance, including reflection on the moral criteria which they are using to make these 
judgements. For instance, Stark’s (2009) study of the change in the political system in Eastern 
Europe documents the moral uncertainty created due to competing sets of former socialist 
values versus the capitalist moral order. When new practices appear in established industries 
they also give rise to this moral uncertainty (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). For instance, the rise of 
genetically engineered plants in the agricultural industry gave rise to a widespread debate 
about which moral criteria should be used to judge this practice (some using notions of 
efficiency, others appealing to notions such as the integrity of life). 
In sum, these critical situations, where taken-for-granted orders of worth have been called into 
question, involve a significant degree of uncertainty about which order of worth to use to 
judge a particular organization and its practices as right and wrong. In such situations there is 
not just a lack of certainty about moral legitimacy but there is also uncertainty about the 
criteria which should be used. This typically occurs when multiple moral schemes have been 
brought into conflict, creating a situation of moral multiplexity.  
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Negotiating moral legitimacy through dialogue  
When tensions between multiple orders of worth emerge, organizations can negotiate 
settlements between different moral expectations through dialogue with their audiences. 
Rather than passive normative compliance with stakeholder pressure, the need to engage in 
dialogue reflects a shift in “the modus of responsibility from the reactive model […] to a 
proactive concept of societal involvement” (Scherer & Palazzo, 2007, p. 1110). Dialogue 
prompts actors to be reflective about the moral assumptions they base their actions upon, and 
engages actors in acts of public justification by drawing on the 'moral grammar' of orders of 
worth (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006). The opportunity to exploit the frictions at the interplay 
of multiple orders of worth (Stark, 2009) opens up multiple possibilities to reconcile conflict 
and reach a truce. Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) mainly focus on compromise as a way to 
bring multiple orders of worth together. Building on their work, we suggest that dialogical 
processes can result in transcendence or antagonism as alternative truces. 
Negotiating a compromise 
The first way to address conflicts arising from moral multiplexity is negotiating a compromise 
between two or more moral schemes. Compromise is created when “people agree to […] 
suspend a clash […] without settling it through recourse to a test in just one of the worlds” 
(Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006, p. 278). But agreement is reached without clarifying the 
principle of agreement itself. This can be achieved through the construction of moral hybrids 
which bring together different moral schemes on equal terms. For example, statements like “a 
faithful friend is a solvent client” indicates that arguments from the ‘market’ world are 
equated with ‘domestic’ world (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006, p. 278). Or, consider the state 
bureaucracy that unites principles of ‘civic’ worth (collective justice, democracy) and 
principles of ‘industrial’ worth (hierarchy, division of labour, rule following).  
How can corporations negotiate moral compromises with their audiences? Since it is often 
civil society actors “that map, filter, amplify, bundle, and transmit private problems, needs, 
and values” (Scherer & Palazzo, 2007, p. 1107), one way in which corporations increasingly 
seek to engage in direct dialogue with societal actors is through multi-stakeholder initiatives 
or platforms. For instance, Fairtrade Labelling is a multi-stakeholder umbrella organization 
that seeks to negotiate a “fair prices.” This combines market worth with civic and domestic 
worth as it uses market-based mechanisms to improve the livelihoods of producers and enable 
consumers to make more ethical choices (Reinecke, 2010). In studying the multi-stakeholder 
negotiation of fair prices, Reinecke and Ansari (2015) found that stakeholders may not be able 
to conclusively resolve conflicts, but can settle on “ethical truces” as a way to reach a 
reasonable agreement amidst conflicting parties. 
The emergence of new practices and markets is a revealing site for the study of establishing 
moral legitimacy through compromises. New markets often face challenges to moral 
legitimacy. For instance, some goods, like life or death, may be seen as morally illegitimate 
for trade (Carruthers & Espeland, 1998). The marketization of previously non-marketable 
goods requires work on changing moral perceptions in order to construct the market’s moral 
legitimacy. Zelizer (1983) showed how life insurance became an industry only when the 
moral perception of insuring against death changed from a moral offense (speculating on 
death) to a moral responsibility (ensuring financial security for one’s family). Instead of 
seeing a clash between the domestic world, in which the death of a relative is a personal 
tragedy, and the market world, in which death is a calculable risk, a compromise between the 
domestic and the market world allowed resolving incompatibility. Almeling’s (2011) study of 
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the market for human genetic material (i.e. eggs and sperm) in the United States illustrates 
how compromise is possible without agreeing on the relevant order of worth. Whereas trading 
genetic material was unthinkable before, by now it has developed into a multi-billion dollar 
industry. Whereas the act of sperm donation has been legitimated in terms of market worth 
(i.e. making money from one’s body), for women egg donation has been framed as an 
altruistic act. It is the gift of life from one nurturing woman to the other (domestic worth). 
This gender division in the justification of donating eggs and sperm has allowed trade to 
become morally legitimate.  
However, negotiating compromises may be an evolving process and result in different forms 
of agreement. In a study on the attempt to create of a market for weather derivatives, Huault 
& Rainelli-Weiss (2011) examine the struggle between industrial firms and market promoters 
to (unsuccessfully) negotiate a compromise. Market promoters tried to construct weather 
derivatives (market worth) as a solution to the threat of global warming (green worth). 
However, they failed to convey the legitimacy of their favoured solution – a market for 
financial weather derivatives – as serving a common interest. Unable to achieve 
commensuration, actors in the market for weather derivatives then suspended conflicting 
worldviews and adopted local solutions in the form of private arrangements and composite 
setups.  
Organizations can also establish compromise by suspending the original conflict and reverting 
to a third scheme that does not solve the conflict but helps to bypass it. Anteby’s (2010) study 
of trade in human cadavers for medical education and research in the U.S. illustrates how the 
focus of moral assessment was shifted away from the question of categorical legitimacy of 
whether commerce in cadavers was morally legitimate toward the process of how trading 
should take place, hence evading more fundamental questions about the nature of the activity 
itself. This shift allowed professionals to define appropriate practices according to a scientific 
moral scheme and establish a morally legitimate market.  
Negotiating Transcendence 
The second, and more ambitious way to address conflicts arising from moral multiplexity 
aims at negotiating transcendent worth. Other than compromise, where conflict between 
orders of worth is temporarily stabilised but not conclusively resolved, transcendence 
involves the creation of a new moral reference point that aligns two or more existing schemes 
under a new, higher-level point of reference. Dialogue partners aim “at a common good that 
transcends the two different forms of worth in presence by including them both” (Boltanski & 
Thévenot, 2006, p. 278).  
The emergence of new orders of worth, such as the “projective” (Boltanski & Chiapello, 
2005) or the “green” order of worth (Lafaye & Thévenot, 1993; Lamont & Thévenot, 2000) 
illustrate how such new moral reference points emerge and stabilize over time. Repeat cycles 
of disputes and justification engender societal-level changes so that underlying tensions 
between orders of worth become increasingly blurred, making this type of dialogue less prone 
to the fragility of a compromise. Boltanski and Chiapello (2005) describe how legitimacy 
crisis of capitalism championed by social movements in the 1960s and 1970s did not 
undermine capitalist ways of production but was recuperated and successfully integrated into 
a new networked and “projective” order of worth. Instead of bureaucracy and the 
‘organizational man’, the post-Fordist neo-management regime celebrated the values of 
expressive creativity, fluid identity, autonomy and self-development. This renewed “the spirit 
of capitalism,” or “the ideology that justifies engagement in capitalism,” and created an 
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entirely new moral reference point for moral legitimacy: projective worth (Boltanski & 
Chiapello, 2005, p. 8, emphasis original). 
The notion of sustainability or green worth (Lamont & Thévenot, 2000) is also a good 
example of how a new point of moral reference emerged through dialogue between various 
parties. Sustainability as an order of worth, in its ideal form, effectively moves the frame of 
judgment to an entirely new moral reference point, in this case that of sustainability and its 
consideration for “people, planet, profit” or the “triple bottom line” (Elkington, 1997). The 
way this new moral reference shapes corporate practice is illustrated in the emerging 
corporate practice of integrated reporting. Rather than keeping financial and sustainability 
reports separate, integrated reporting is a form of corporate disclosure that combines financial 
and non-financial reporting. As Van Bommel (2014) examined, the aim of integrated reporting 
is to ‘transcend’ the different logics of valuation and come to a novel holistic and integrated 
form of valuation of firms’ ‘worth’ where industrial, market, civic and green order of worth 
truly come together. But Van Bommel’s analysis also highlights the risk that integrated 
reporting gets captured by investors and accountants, leading to local private arrangements 
(see below) rather than transcendence, highlighting the difficulties in reaching the latter. 
As these examples show, over time, consensus around a higher common principle, agreement 
on forms of coordination and model tests can become established and institutionalized. 
Legitimate representations of worth emerge. However, reaching a more stable settlement on 
transcendence is an incremental process of change that cannot be negotiated by a single 
company but requires wider, societal-level changes. Negotiating parties are likely to operate 
within a grey area between hybridity and transcendence, making transcendence a regulative 
ideal rather than a reality of dialogue. 
Negotiating Antagonism 
The final way to settle conflicts arising from moral multiplexity is through antagonism. 
Rather than solving conflicts through what may be only fragile compromises, this entails 
strongly siding with one particular moral scheme and counter-posing it against another. In 
processes of dialogue this typically means adopting a moral position and instead of being 
willing to change, adjust and shift it as Habermasian accounts suggest ideally should happen 
(e.g. Scherer & Palazzo, 2007), the moral position becomes even more entrenched and clearly 
demarcated from other moral schemes. It is this process of sharpening up an order of worth 
through bringing it into direct conflict with another order that we call antagonism (Laclau & 
Mouffe, 1985). Antagonism does not allow a settlement which bridges across divides in a 
debate, but it does provide the ability to strengthen the commitment to a common order of 
worth amongst a narrower audience. This may overcome conflict between different schemes 
of worth by putting them into contrast with a third, commonly opposed scheme of worth such 
as targeting a “common enemy.”  
The focus on a particular order of worth can come from dominant groups who have the 
resources and capacity to force a particular favoured scheme onto others. But in other cases, 
more marginal ‘resistant’ groups who are engaged in dialogical processes may follow a 
similar strategy. For instance, the “Slow Food” movement was created when an Italian 
journalist took up a direct protest against the opening of a McDonalds store near the Spanish 
steps in Rome by sitting near-by and eating a bowl of traditional pasta. This protest sparked 
the imagination of many in Italy because it set up a clear antagonistic protest against ‘fast 
food’. The result was the coining of a novel set of practices and labels around the concept of 
‘slow food’. The advantage of following this antagonistic strategy meant that the Slow Food 
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movement could bring together a range of actors who were often committed to quite different 
schemes of worth. For instance, it was able to forge links between environmentalists 
(committed to a ‘green’ order of worth), small farmers (committed to a domestic order of 
worth), social justice campaigners (committed to a civic order of worth), and chefs 
(committed to an inspired order of worth) (Van Bommel & Spicer, 2011). By focusing on a 
commonly reviled order of worth associated with fast food (the industrial order), they were 
able to side-step many of the potential conflicts and forge a sense of commonality.  
By forging strong unity, an antagonistic settlement avoids many of the problems associated 
with crafting reference to a higher order of worth or brokering a compromise between 
multiple orders of worth. But this also means that significant work goes into maintaining and 
reinforcing differences, rather than bridging differences between the groups who are involved 
and their moral schemes.  
Legitimacy: Scope and certainty 
In line with the orders of worth, we view legitimacy in continuous rather that in binary terms. 
This contrasts with the established notion of legitimacy (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008). This 
treats legitimacy as a dichotomous variable whereby “an organization’s form and behavior 
either fits or does not fit with the established social norms” (Bitektine, 2011, p. 161). Whereas 
regulative legitimacy (Scott, 1995) can be argued as being dichotomous (i.e. you are either in 
compliance or not) for moral legitimacy the verdict may be less clear. This is particularly true 
when considering the multiplicity of the evaluating audience and the more contentious nature 
of morality. Given multiple orders of worth each have their own criteria for worthiness, a 
practice may be regarded more or less worthy according to different orders of worth (Cloutier 
& Langley, 2013) – while different audiences privilege different orders of worth. With that in 
mind, we argue for a view of moral legitimacy as a continuous variable, and suggest that 
different dialogical settlements can create varying degrees of scope and certainty of moral 
legitimacy.  
Scope  
While legitimacy is often said to lie in the eye of the beholder, there are different 
“legitimating audiences” that may judge the same actions differently: “legitimacy is always 
assessed by multiple audiences and with respect to multiple activities” (Deephouse & 
Suchman, 2008, p. 62). Prior research has looked at how various stakeholder groups may 
favor different orders of worth and hence use different criteria to evaluate an organization or 
practice as legitimate or not (e.g. Lamin & Zaheer, 2012; Pontikes, 2012). Legitimacy is thus 
not a binary variable attributable to the organization but is contingent on the relationship with 
the evaluating audience. This points to the scope of moral legitimacy.  
We define the scope of legitimacy as the degree to which dialogue seeks to appeal to the 
common good of a shared humanity, thus mobilizes an inclusive principle of justice so that 
efforts are made to try and accommodate the values of a plurality of legitimating audiences. 
Moral legitimacy is wide in scope if an organization or practice appeals to the common good 
of all. It is narrow in scope if justifications exclude those who do not already support the 
moral worth in question. An organization or practice with a narrow scope of moral legitimacy 
often appeals to one order of worth at the expense of other, and thus enjoys legitimacy only 
within the niche of those audiences who value this particular order of worth.  
The most extreme form of a narrow scope would be what Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) call 
a “private arrangement.” A private arrangement is reached by mutual agreement of parties 
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who benefit from it yet without laying claim to a common good at a wider societal level. It 
thus rests on shared interests and has no legitimacy beyond the parties involved or those 
outside the arrangement. Thus, parties to a “private arrangement” avoid drawing on a 
principle of justice that would be recognized outside the situation. What matters is whether 
the parties involved manage to establish equivalence among themselves: “[t] he concession 
that is made in a private arrangement consists precisely in avoiding recourse to a principle of 
justice: people come to terms among themselves—that is, locally” (Boltanski & Thévenot, 
2006, p. 128). Thus, the “common” in common good is reduced to the parties involved in the 
private arrangement, rather than the parties’ membership of a shared humanity. 
Contracts are a good example of private arrangements. Contracts are considered fair to parties 
if they were reached by voluntary agreement among consenting adults and are mutually 
beneficial, regardless of whether or not they also benefit outside parties. But even if private 
agreements have no adverse effects on outside audiences, their morality may remain highly 
questionable to a wider audience. Consider the controversial case of consensual cannibalism 
that has shocked the world and puzzled moral philosophers (e.g. Sandel, 2010). In 2004, a 
German cannibal found a voluntary victim on a website for people with cannibalism fetishes, 
and subsequently killed and ate the consenting victim while documenting the making of their 
agreement and subsequent deed on video. 
In a “private arrangement,” parties may share a strong moral code but do not seek moral 
approval from others who may disagree. This resembles an “all or nothing” approach where 
parties who believe in the legitimacy of a practice are included while others are excluded. 
Other examples are religious sects, such as Scientology. Or the Sicilian Mafia, widely 
considered an illegal and immoral organization: It is built on a strong moral code that 
demarcates insiders from outsiders. The Mafia’s identity is “separate and distinct from that of 
the wider polis, which makes the mafioso ‘feel’ proudly different and foreign” from the social 
context in which they actually live (Di Maria & Falgares, 2013, p. 2). Yet, as an organization 
it excels at instilling strong values and world views in its members, establishing codes of 
conduct such as codes of honour, and strictly enforcing them.  
To enjoy a broad scope of legitimacy, organizations need to appeal to the common good of 
multiple audiences. Mission-driven organizations such as charities, NGOs or 
intergovernmental organizations typically claim to promote the common good of wider 
society based on universal values. For instance, Oxfam, an international confederation of 
charitable organizations, focuses on the alleviation of global poverty. Its mission is justified 
based on the universality of human rights which, amongst others, includes the right to a 
sustainable livelihood or the right to life and security.  
Organizations seeking broad scope of moral legitimacy typically need to be “multivocal” 
(Padgett & Ansell, 1993) and appeal to multiple principles of justice at once. Multivocal 
organizations can entertain a dialogue that engages and appeals to the values of different 
constituencies. This can widen the scope of moral legitimacy when the resulting agreement is 
seen legitimate according to multiple stakeholder groups. CSR can be seen in this context as a 
strategy to become more multivocal and widen the scope of corporations’ moral legitimacy. 
Corporate moral legitimacy has narrowed due to the widespread adoption of a shareholder-
value orientation in liberal market economies, which privileged legitimacy with stock owners 
as primary beneficiaries. This has led to growing scrutiny of the role of private corporations in 
the public sphere. CSR activities may hence be seen as a corporation’s attempt to engage in 
dialogue with other stakeholders, such as by participating in dialogue in multi-stakeholder 
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initiatives or platforms to address wider societal values. To be sure, business firms may be 
culpable to similar illegal and immoral acts as the Mafia, such as mining companies 
collaborating with corrupt regimes to profit from a country’s natural resources while violating 
the rights of indigenous people and polluting the environment (Banerjee, 2008; Gond, 
Palazzo, & Basu, 2009). However, the difference is that corporations justify their actions as 
contributing to the common good through CSR and job creation to legitimize their operations. 
Certainty  
In addition to differences in scope, moral legitimacy can also be more or less certain. This is 
in line with Deephouse and Suchman (2008, p. 62) who argue that “legitimacy can vary in its 
certainty and security. Thus, a firm can become ‘more legitimate’ by becoming more clearly 
legitimate, more firmly legitimate, or both”. Certainty refers to the degree to which a practice 
is consistently and predictably judged as worthy within a particular order of worth. As table 2 
showed earlier, the orders of worth framework consists of various factors that together help to 
establish the strength of worthiness/legitimacy. For instance, the states of worthiness have to 
be sufficiently present and states of deficiency avoided. The higher common principles need 
to be adhered to, both rhetorically as well as in actual practices. For instance, a high turnout 
and high percentage of the vote in a democratic election creates a strong democratic mandate 
for a particular party, or worthiness within the civic order of worth. Ultimately, “higher levels 
of worthiness can be achieved if one makes a significant, preferably irreversible, commitment 
to those beliefs, in the form of an investment, which is different from one world to the next. 
Those who make such an investment will be deemed to be particularly worthy (e.g. 
legitimate) in a given world and will be able to act as legitimate spokespersons on behalf of 
that world” (Cloutier & Langley, 2013, p. 367).  
When multiple orders of worth are competing, certainty of the settlement increases when 
dialogue partners come to an agreement on either the order of worth that should apply to 
evaluate a practice, or can decide on the type of settlement. Certainty decreases however 
when actors retain conflicting views on either which order of worth to apply (as in fragile 
compromise situations) or when an investment in a particular order of worth is weak or 
conflicting. Audiences then have more reservations and conflicting judgements may increase 
doubts in the legitimacy of a practice.  
But the consensus that underpins certainty may simply reflect a stabilization of dominant 
forms of justification: “Consensus in a liberal-democratic society is – and will always be – the 
expression of hegemony and the crystallization of power relations” (Mouffe, 2000, p. 49). 
Powerful groups can increase certainty through investment in institutional forms (or 
“objects”) to buttress their moral legitimacy and (morally “justified”) dominance. When 
politically established values are inscribed into institutional formats or complex juridical 
frames they appear as legitimate conventions (Thévenot, 1997) that “begin to speak and say it 
is just” (Marin, 2001, p. 75). This produces normalising judgements and unitary scales of 
what is ‘good’, ‘fair’ or ‘ethical,’ which citizens who are ‘reasonable’ will respect (Boltanski, 
2011). As a practice or entity becomes so widely accepted as part of the normal state of 
affairs, it may gradually result in a hegemonic position. By this we mean, the moral 
legitimacy is implicitly assumed and simply ‘goes without saying.’ This recasts justifications 
in terms of technologies for creating soft power to establish, maintain or contest a particular 
definition of what is morally legitimate. 
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Types of Moral Legitimacy emerging from Dialogue  
Depending on the combination of scope and certainty, the kind of legitimacy that emerges 
from the dynamic interchange between a particular organization and its audiences varies. In 
what follows, we will argue that transcendence strategies give rise to strong legitimacy, 
compromise strategies create fragile legitimacy and antagonism creates niche legitimacy (See 
Figure 2). 
------INSERT FIGURE TWO ABOUT HERE --- 
Compromise creates fragile legitimacy.  
Compromise tends to create legitimacy which has a wide (inclusive) scope yet low levels of 
certainty. While compromises seek to make judgements based on objects stemming from 
different worlds compatible, they never fully resolve the tension between competing orders of 
worth. In a compromise, different parties stick to their preferred order of worth, but treat 
competing orders of worth as morally equivalent and compatible and “act as if they could rely 
upon a higher-level principle” (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1999, p. 375). Because the “as if” can 
easily be revoked, compromises tend to remain fragile and can easily be challenged. 
This is illustrated in hybrid settlements, where organizations continue to struggle with 
competing external demands (Pache & Santos, 2010) and competing identities among internal 
constituencies (Kraatz & Block, 2008; Zilber, 2002). The literature on social-business hybrids 
highlights that tensions are never completely resolved in these settings, but organizations 
continue to navigate the tension between conflicting pressures (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; 
Jay, 2013). Today’s well-known Fairtrade label achieved greater alignment with the market 
order of worth. This increased sales but also renewed contestations among pioneers about the 
relevant order of worth to judge the worthiness of the label (Reinecke, 2010; VanderHoff 
Boersma, 2009). The Fairtrade example indicates that while compromises hold a potentially 
wide range of different schemes of justification and their attendant social worlds together, 
they are also inherently fragile or uncertain because they can always be potentially challenged 
from the perspective of one participating world. Even if stable agreement seems to have been 
reached, conflicts between deep seated assumptions held by market audiences and producer 
communities may be revealed in situations of change and crisis (Reinecke & Ansari, 2015). 
This means that the moral legitimacy which is produced by bringing these different worlds 
together is itself inherently fragile – it could be open to contestation at any potential moment.  
At times, dominant organizations may increase the certainty of their own legitimacy through 
compromises that keep critical voices at bay. Although CSR and its radical claims seemed at 
first to pose a threat to business and possible work as a Trojan horse, over time CSR has been 
absorbed by the ‘business case’ (Levy, Reinecke, & Manning, 2016). Environmental activists 
(committed to a ‘green’ order of worth), social justice activists (committed to a civic order of 
worth), and business organizations (committed to a market and/or industrial orders of worth) 
have often abandoned their oppositional stance in favour of cooperating for small gains. 
Corporations have used CSR practices such as social and environmental reporting “to reduce 
antagonism toward business from various social segments, obtaining consent for its actions 
and thereby (re)producing its ideological hegemony” (Spence, 2007, p. 856). However, CSR 
as a compromise is likely to remain fragile because corporations do not sincerely seek to align 
multiple orders of worth, but use it only instrumentally stabilize their own moral legitimacy 
vis-a-vis wider society.  
In sum, while compromises are able to unite a larger number of actors, the moral legitimacy is 
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of lower certainty, leading to a more fragile sense of moral legitimacy. Because legitimacy 
based on compromises requires actors to navigate tensions between multiple schemes, it 
remains relatively uncertain. Alignment between these different schemes may be called into 
question or unsettled, requiring renewed dialogue to maintain moral legitimacy. Thus the 
plurality of worlds is a constant source of potential disruption to the stability of a 
compromise. 
Transcendence creates strong legitimacy  
Transcendence leads to a stronger sense of moral legitimacy with wide scope and high levels 
of certainty. It enables a wide range of actors to transcend many previously established 
conflicts between different worlds, which are now seen as irrelevant. The legitimacy is broad 
in scope, i.e. inclusive. In contrast to compromises, transcendence not only establishes 
equivalences between orders of worth but creates principles that are firmly grounded in 
multiple orders of worth or even foundational for entirely new orders of worth. Thus, they are 
much stronger in certainty, i.e. at its core not constantly questioned and disrupted.  
Consider how hybrid strategies may attempt to reach transcendence. Hybrid organizations, 
such as social enterprises, seek to bring notions of social welfare together with market-
oriented behaviour (Tracey et al., 2011). As long as multiple moral schemes exist alongside 
one another without an attempt to integrate them the compromise may be revoked or 
questioned. Multiple moral schemes would need to become integrated in order for 
transcendence to be reached. For instance, new voluntary legal forms, such as the “benefit 
corporation” (B Corp) in the US or the community interest corporation (CIC) in the UK, seek 
to enable companies to include positive impact on society, workers, the community and the 
environment in addition to profit as their legally defined goals. By adopting these legal forms, 
corporations can pursue a mission to serve the common good of multiple stakeholders. 
Because fewer disputes about orders of worth take place, a transcendent scheme creates 
greater certainty in moral legitimacy and increases the moral worth of an entity or practice. 
This reduces demands for justification, and by implication need for time consuming and 
costly dialogue in order to reconcile clashing moral positions.  
Antagonism creates Niche Legitimacy 
Antagonism contributes to a niche legitimacy which is narrow in scope yet can be high in 
certainty. Niche legitimacy is typically characterized by a strong sense of “us” against a 
“them”. The group of supporters for this antagonistic position can sometimes (but not 
exclusively) be relatively small in numbers, yet strong in force and conviction of their stance. 
This oppositional character of the antagonistic approach ignites a commitment. By developing 
justifications which are based on an opposition to other orders of worth, actors are able to 
establish a niche form of moral legitimacy which is accepted only by a relatively narrow 
group. In order to defend these schemes actors may seek to actively distance themselves from 
others who champion different orders of worth.  
An antagonistic settlement thus requires some degree of exclusion. Organizations then forego 
engaging in dialogue to negotiate their moral legitimacy altogether in favour of ‘sticking to 
their principles’. This “enclaving” further increases distance between their own claims and 
those of other groups (Douglas & Mars, 2003). Because of this distance, the group reconfirms 
a sense of common commitment to their championed order of worth. For instance, 
industrialized food producers are excluded from the Slow Food movement (Van Bommel & 
Spicer, 2011). It is precisely their distancing from ‘fast food’, or more generally for activists, 
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the sense of being alternative or resisting the dominant social order that “provides the energy 
and legitimacy for many civic movement organizations” (Spicer & Bohm, 2007, pp. 1681–2). 
This allows actors to develop and maintain a common antagonistic settlement. Proponents are 
unwilling to engage in meaningful dialogue with proponents of different orders of worth, as 
this could be seen as a sign of ‘selling out’. If proponents of Slow Food were to engage in 
dialogue with fast food operators they would run a significant risk of damaging the 
antagonistic agreement that holds together the different groups involved in Slow Food.   
For instance, in the case of US car brand Hummer, the scope of moral legitimacy may be low, 
yet the degree of certainty is high. For the enthusiastic and proud fans of this controversial 
car, moral legitimacy is certain as they are performing an act of patriotism and being truly and 
proudly American (Luedicke, Thompson, & Giesler, 2010). Yet, driving a Hummer enjoys 
only niche legitimacy since opponents may regard the driving of a Hummer as an 
environmentally degrading practice. Similar examples include radical activists, such as 
uncompromising veganarchists or members of the Animal Liberation Front who engage in 
direct action in the pursuit of animal rights alongside wider social revolution. While their 
values such as protecting animals, may in principle appeal to a wider group, radicals typically 
stand in opposition to mainstream society and are thus likely to alienate outsiders who are 
uncomfortable with the militant discourse and culture of the activists. 
In other cases, certainty is achieved through a combination of moral values and violence. The 
Sicilian Mafia is a good example of this. Its legitimacy is extremely narrow in scope for it is 
based on separateness from its community and the state with its norms, laws and values. But 
it is high in certainty for its dogmatic culture demands obedience, loyalty and an extreme 
sense of belonging from its affiliates. Scholars have argued that this is achieved through the 
ideological framework of the family where father/son-type relationships create strong bonds 
based on loyalty, faith and protection that instil a strong emotional sense of belonging (Di 
Maria & Falgares, 2013). From within this moral and ideological framework of Mafia 
organization “even the most heinous crimes may be considered ‘right’ – from the sacrifice of 
their real family to the taking of their own lives” (Di Maria & Falgares, 2013, p. 3).  
In sum, antagonistic settlements are exclusive, yet relatively stable as they may result in self-
reinforcing processes whereby antagonism leads to enclaving that further sustains 
antagonism. The strong moral commitment that is needed to sustain antagonism may be 
driven either by strong moral enthusiasm, as often in the case of social movement activists, or 
by symbolic or actual violence, as in the case of the Mafia. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
In this paper, we have set out to explore how actors construct a sense of moral legitimacy 
around a practice when they are faced with multiple moral schemes. We have drawn on the 
orders of worth framework (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006) to argue that creating moral 
legitimacy in the face of moral multiplexity involves engagement in a process of justification 
where actors aim to bring together different and often clashing orders of worth through a  
form of dialogue. We suggested that this dynamic dialogical process can yield a range of 
different moral truces. By providing a model which outlines how actors cope in contexts of 
moral multiplexity, we offer three contributions.  
Contributions 
First, we extend existing studies of organizational legitimacy (Bitektine, 2011; Deephouse & 
Suchman, 2008; Suchman, 1995). In particular, we contribute to reviving the debate around 
 Reinecke, Bommel & Spicer – Negotiating Legitimacy – RSO  23 
the somewhat neglected topic of moral legitimacy (Patriotta et al., 2011). Existing work has 
typically focused on the importance of creating fit with dominant societal wide schemes. We 
challenge the binary conception of moral legitimacy that has been prevalent in much of the 
institutional literature, and suggest that moral legitimacy should be seen as a property of the 
dynamic interplay of an organization with multiple groups in its environment and their often 
distinct moral value orientations. The result of this dialogical process is less likely to be either 
“fit” or not, but moral legitimacy with varying levels of scope and certainty. This has 
important implications for understanding how aspects of institutional complexity are 
negotiated (e.g. Greenwood et al., 2011).        
Considering the varying scope and certainty of legitimacy draws attention to the different 
strategies that organizations can pursue in order to increase their legitimacy with different 
constituents. Rather than a “one-size-fits” all approach to moral legitimacy, moral 
multiplexity means that the process of legitimacy negotiations is multi-faceted, and 
contingent on different types of audiences each of which may require different types of moral 
truces. Firms can target their legitimacy efforts towards different audiences by engaging 
particular audiences in dialogue, while neglecting others based on what is judged as 
“acceptable risk” of legitimacy loss (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1983). They may choose to focus 
on the demands of the most salient stakeholder groups, who have greater power or urgency to 
push their claims (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997). Other organizations may need to be more 
multi-vocal and gain legitimacy across multiple audiences. For instance, a multi-national, 
consumer-facing retailer needs to negotiate its legitimacy at multiple fronts, involving a wide 
range of stakeholders with different priorities, such as investors, employees and unions, 
governments, consumers and the general public. In contrast, a supplier of specialized products 
at the upstream end of the supply chain might be more focused on gaining moral legitimacy at 
the community level, the organization’s most immediate environment.  
Second, we contribute to the emergent stream of work which uses the orders of worth 
typology to examine organizational processes (e.g. Denis, Langley, & Rouleau, 2007; 
Friedland, 2009; Gond et al., 2016; Kaplan & Murray, 2010; Patriotta et al., 2011; Stark, 
2009). That is, we bring together various elements of the orders of worth framework in a 
dynamic and systematic process model that distinguishes three types of temporary truces that 
can result from dialogue, each leading to different certainty and scope of moral legitimacy. 
We argue that actors can forge an agreement through establishing agreement on a higher order 
of worth (transcendence) which likely leads to a strong sense of legitimacy which has a wide 
scope and evokes relatively little uncertainty. When multiple orders of worth are bridged 
through a compromise) a relatively fragile sense of moral legitimacy is created which still has 
a wide scope but actors can be less certain about. Finally, when actors establish an 
antagonistic truce by focusing on their opposition with a common enemy-type order of worth, 
a niche sense of legitimacy is established which has a narrow scope but by relatively high 
certainty. We hereby extend studies on the orders of worth framework that primarily identify 
various orders of worth or note that they are oftentimes blended (Patriotta et al., 2011; van 
Bommel, 2014). We instead offer a more systematic account of how practices are justified 
under situations of moral legitimacy and the different patterns of moral legitimacy this gives 
rise to. We also highlight the dynamic and processual nature of this model.  
Third, and related, we build on prior studies on the communicative approach that regards 
moral legitimacy as the outcome of dialogue among organizations and various stakeholders 
(Scherer & Palazzo, 2007, 2011). Whereas prior work on a communicative approach to moral 
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legitimacy remained silent on what constitutes the force of a better argument and assumed the 
notion of consensus,  through our process model we offer a systematic account of exactly how 
organizations negotiate multiple moral schemes and achieve various types of ethical truces. 
We hereby challenge the analytical distinction between evaluated organizations and 
evaluating audiences. In particular, we demonstrate that the orders of worth framework is not 
only useful to understand the different moral bases of practices and organizations, but also to 
examine how conflicts between contesting scripts are negotiated and resolved and with what 
possible consequences in terms of legitimacy. This adds further nuance to the process of 
dialogue as in the communicative approach. This is important, as the role of social and moral 
values and their entanglement with economic value has gained increasing attention across 
management scholarship. For instance, strategy scholars have focused on the role of social 
value systems in the firm’s context in driving economic value. The culturally informed 
resource based view “weaves understanding of culture and social values into the 
fundamentals of economic value creation” (Maurer, Bansal & Crossan, 2011, p. 12). Our 
framework based on the orders of worth helps to understand the moral multiplexity that firms 
encounter in their context, and how truces are negotiated at the intersection between 
organizations and morally fragmented fields.  
 
Implications for Research 
Our paper suggests a number of novel lines of future research. Following the process model 
outlined in this paper, future empirical studies might explore linkages between the various 
processes of dealing with moral multiplexity. First, does more uncertainty actually give rise to 
increased efforts to provide justification for a practice? If so, are there different kinds of moral 
uncertainty or different degrees of moral uncertainty which provoke different sorts of 
justification work? Could there also be a broader form of uncertainty around whether moral 
judgements should be used as a basis to assess a practice, rather than say cognitive or 
legislative judgements?  
A second cluster of questions would explore the connections between justification and 
dialogue. Researchers might ask whether different configurations are more or less likely to 
give rise to dynamics of dialogue. For instance, are there particular clusters of justifications 
that are more likely to produce a constructive discussion than others? They also might explore 
how the elaboration or articulation of a particular justification may result in more or less 
dynamic forms of dialogue. Finally, research might explore how processes of dialogue can 
actually prompt, reinforce, or maybe even close down moments of justification.  
A third cluster of questions focuses on the differing dynamics of dialogue. This research 
would ask the broader question of why is it that sometimes dialogue between champions of 
different moral positions results in some form of resolution (such as transcendence or 
compromise) or conflict (such as antagonism). To answer this question, future research might 
explore the conditions under which the dialogue is established. For instance this work might 
explore the characteristics of the actors, their various resource endowments, the broader 
structural or governance factors that might shape the platform for dialogue. Furthermore,  
ongoing “values work” is needed for the reconfiguration of networks of social and material 
associations that embed associated practices (Gehman, Trevino, & Garud, 2013). Research 
might also explore the process of dialogue itself. For instance, it might ask whether there are 
particular modes or stages of interaction which lead to more or less productive outcomes.  
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A final cluster of questions would focus on future exploration of how different modes of 
dialogue give rise to different patterns of legitimacy around a practice. Researchers might ask 
whether transcendence always gives rise to strong legitimacy, compromise to fragile 
legitimacy and antagonism to niche legitimacy? Are there particular situations where this is 
more or less likely? Are there particular kinds of practices that are more likely to be 
legitimated in one particular way rather than another? Which particular audiences are likely to 
find each of these forms of legitimation more appealing? Are there situations where dialogical 
processes actually produce illegitimacy around a practice, rather than legitimacy? 
In all, our process model of how moral legitimacy is co-achieved through justifications in 
dialogue with relevant audiences provides ample opportunities for future research at the 
interstices between organization theory and the orders of worth framework.      
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Table 1 Overview of approaches to moral legitimacy 
 Notion of moral legitimacy How it is achieved Critiques Empirical studies 
Weberian Broad legitimate order with a set of 
obligatory maxims and related 
societal norms to guide action, 
particularly around power and 
authority structures 
Social action in compliance with 
broad societal norms and related 
‘obligatory maxims’ 
Implications for specific 
organizations remain unclear; 
focus on systems of power and 
authority 
French & Raven, 1959 
Parsonian Congruence between the 
social values associated with or 
implied by [organizational] activities 
and 
the norms of acceptable behavior in 
the larger social system  
Purposive strategic organizational 
action for fit with broader social 
norms an values 
Norms and social values are 
treated as malleable social entities 
or resources; ignores conflicts and 
inconsistencies within societal 
wide norms 
Zald and Denton, 1963; 
Perrow, 1970; Dowling 
and Pfeffer, 1975 
Neo-Institutional Judgements based on “doing the 
right thing” and whether actions 
benefit society, depending on the 
socially constructed value system in 
place 
Alignment/fit with constructed 
rationalized institutional myths 
around what is considered 
normatively good; moral 
hypocrisy 
Emphasis on normative 
isomorphism and how professions 
rationalize schemes and values; 
ignores multiple and competing 
schemes of moral legitimacy 
Barron, 1998; Ruef & 
Scott, 1998 
Institutional 
Logics 
Legitimacy grounded in a plurality 
of evolving central and holistically 
integrated institutional logics 
Alignment with dominant broad 
institutional logic(s) in the field 
Underplays the normality of 
multiplexity; moral foundations 
of legitimacy evaporate; 
organizations passive recipients 
of institutional prescriptions 
Haveman & Rao, 1997; 
Pache & Santos, 2010; 
Thornton, Ocasio, & 
Lounsbury, 2012 
Communicative 
approach 
Moral legitimacy grounded in the 
multiplex dialogues between the 
corporation and its relevant and 
diverse audience 
Moral legitimacy result of a 
communicative process in which 
better argument prevails. Through 
dialogue organization and 
audiences agree on settlements 
between moral expectations. 
Downplays power; focus on 
process of dialogue rather than 
content; agreement and consensus 
not always achieved 
Scherer & Palazzo, 2007, 
2011 
Orders of Worth Limited number of exisiting moral 
schemes or “orders of worth” that 
are based on the common good and 
provide the normative basis for 
legitimacy   
Actors show their worth/establish 
legitimacy by justifying actions in 
face of uncertainty by drawing on 
common moral schemes/orders of 
worth 
Order of worth framework 
potentially rigid and restrictive 
Boltanski & Thévenot, 
1999, 2006; Patriotta et 
al., 2011; Stark, 2009 
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Table 2 Orders of worth (adapted from Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006; Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005; Lamont & Thévenot, 2000) 
World Market Fame Industrial  Inspired Domestic  Civic Projective  Green 
Common higher 
principle 
Competition Public Opinion Efficiency Inspiration Tradition Collectives Flexible 
connectivity 
Sustainability 
State of 
worthiness 
Desirable Fame Efficient Inexpressible and 
etheral  
Hierarchical 
superiority 
Rule governed 
and representative 
Flexible  Sustainable 
Human dignity Interest  Desire to be 
recognized 
Work Creation Habit Civil rights Spontaneity Preservation 
Subjects Competitors  Stars and their 
fans 
Professionals  Visionaries Superiors and 
Inferiors 
Collective persons 
and their 
representatives 
Partners and 
brokers 
Inhabitants 
Objects Wealth  Names in the 
media 
Means  The waking dream Rules of etiquette Legal forms Projects Nature 
Investment 
formula  
Opportunism  Giving up secrets, 
reveal everything 
to the public (e.g. 
stars revealing 
their private 
lives), make 
messages simple 
to appeal to 
majority opinion 
Progress  Escape from habits 
and routine, calling 
into question, risk, 
detour, shed one’s 
rational mental 
outlook, 
demonstrate 
creativity and 
inventiveness 
Rejection of 
selfishness, 
consideration, 
duties (and debt) 
with respect to 
those for whom one 
is responsible, 
making relations 
harmonious 
The renunciation 
of the particular, 
solidarity, 
transcending 
divisions, 
renunciation of 
immediate interest 
in favour of 
collective 
interests, struggle 
for a cause 
Establish 
connections 
No discount of 
present utility 
Model tests Deal  Presentation of 
the event, 
demonstration, 
press conference, 
inauguration, 
open house 
Trial Vagabondage of the 
mind, adventure, 
quest, mental 
vogue, pathfinding, 
lived experience 
Family ceremonies, 
celebration, social 
events, nomination, 
conversation, 
distinction, 
Demonstration of 
a just cause 
Mobilization of 
network 
Greening 
Judgement  Price  Public opinion Effective  The stroke of 
genius 
Knowing how to 
bestow trust 
The verdict of the 
vote 
Ease of 
connectivity  
Ecological 
balance 
Evidence Money  Success  Measurement Intuition Exemplary 
anecdote 
Legal test Number of 
connections 
Long-term impact 
State of 
Deficiency  
Enslavement to 
money 
Indifference and 
banality 
Instrumental 
action 
Temptation to come 
down to earth 
Lack of inhibition Devision  Bondage Pollution 
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Figure 1 Process model of building moral legitimacy in situations of moral multiplexity 
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Figure 2: Certainty and scope of moral legitimacy 
 
 
 
 
 
